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/\ S THE nineteenth century passed into its last quarter there was
^^ agitation in Ja])an for a people's parliament. Scarcely ten
years had elapsed since the last of the ^'okngawa shoguns, Keiki,
had surrendered his office to the youthful Enij)eror, Meiji. and with
it the actual headship of the government, which his family had
monopolized for three and a half centuries, in order that adminis-
trative authority might he centralized and the empire enabled w
"maintain its rank and dignity among the nations." During that
decade political societies had appeared, led by no lesser persons than
Okuma Shigenobu of the Hizen clan and Itagaki Taisuke of Tosa.
provoked by the apparent intention of the leaders of the greater
western clans, Choshu and Satsuma, to constitute themselves sole
heirs of the governmental power which the Tokugawa daimyo had
monopolized since the sixteenth century. Okuma and Itagaki, to-
gether with other disgnmtled lesser clansmen, purposed to call into
political life a new force, public opinion, to assist them in a strug-
gle for a division of the Tokugawa legacy.
On a winter's day in 1889 the agitation of the "politicians," as
the leaders of the popular movement came to be called, in distinc-
tion froin their opponents, the Satsuma and Choshu oligarchs, bore
fruit. Before a distinguished company in the palace at Tokvo the
constitution was read on February 11. a day already consecrated
as Kigensetsu, the legendary date of the founding, in 660 B.C., of
the imperial Yamato dynasty, which continues to the present mo-
ment. Shorter even than the constitution of the Ignited States, the
Japanese instrument is modeled upon the constitution of pre-revolu-
tionary Prussia and other German state constitutions. Its drafters
made a study of the American constitution but found in it only
warnings, sign-posts of dangers to be avoided.
\\^ere the demands of the newly-fledged political parties for a
share in governmental power satisfied ? Hardly. The constitution
was less a concession to them than to those great Occidental states
with which Japan had entered into treaties that she regarded as
shameful. They were insistent that the surrender of consular juris-
*For authorities as to facts and interpretation, see the writer's Japan-
ese Government and Politics, Century Company, New York, 1932.
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diction must be preceded 1)\' a modernization, that is. a W'esterniza-
tion, of law and administration. Hence Japan conformed, publish-
ing in succession codes of criminal law and procedure modeled upon
those of France, civil law and procedure mingling French and Ger-
man with native principles, and a constitution of essentially German
pattern. But she took care to inscribe in the first article of the con-
stitution the basic idea known as kokiitai, the eternal oneness of
the reigning dynasty with the state. This idea was fully supported
by the centralization of all power in the Emperor.
Centralization, however, in name only. The actual relation of
the Emperor to the government was altered only in form. The con-
stitution codified the "Restoration" of 1868, a restoration of the
Emperor to dignity only, not to power. Throughout the seven cen-
turies of feudalism the imperial ofiice had, in theory, been the loca-
tion of authority. So completely had the fact of shogunal domina-
tion obscured this theory that the theory itself w^as forgotten and
was only resurrected by scholars in the latter eighteenth century.
The Restoration restored the theory but continued the fact of vi-
carious rule, simply transferring the reality of power from one
group of oligarchs to another. The constitution, drafted by the new
oligarchy, set up but feeble checks upon its program of usurpation.
From the point of view of the liberals, the efifect of this vari-
ance between the letter and the spirit was of no immediate im-
portance. Their efi"orts to breathe life into the infant Diet were
maintained for a few years but it proved a puny thing for lack of
e.xercise, albeit not lacking in lung power. All too soon they gave
up the struggle and entered into alliances with the oligarchs, salvag-
ing their ])ride with such appearances of influence as appointments
to ministerial posts and association with such mighty clansmen as
Tto Iliioliunii, Katsura Taro, and Tanaka ( liichi ( wIki accei)tc(l the
presidency of one or another i)arty), and often content to forget
their pride at the price of a fat concession or a retainer sufficient
to win a parliaiiuntary scat. I 'Itiniatcly, the weapmi (if the latter-
day usur])ers may turn in their hands, as it did in the grasp of the
Tokugawa.
llricfly we mav set (lnwii thr i-nni]i(UU'nt agencies ol the Japan-
ese government. .\t the ai)ex is ihc I'mpcror, at once the head of
the extra-constitutional imiKM-ial court and of the constitutional
government. Emperor llirohito"s lioust' is the oldest reigning dy-
nasty and. thanks to coucubinage and adoption, it lia< reigned longer
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than any other in the history of the world. In the middle ages the
imperial scepter was transformed into a priest's baton, the Emperor
taking on divine attributes as head of the Shinto religion and being
forced into seclusion by ambitious officials. Though today the cur-
tain that screened divinity frf)m secular eyes has been withdrawn,
the belief of the masses of the i)co])le in the imperial godhead still
continues. Educated Japanese no longer accept as history the myth-
ology of the divine origin of the state or the Emperor, yet the old
dogmas are given lip-service in deference to popular belief. Eur-
thermore, all acts of state are referred to as though performed by
the Emperor, in strict observance of the terms of the constitution.
What may be called the "crown," that is, the executive depart-
ment of the government, is a composite of the Emperor, two extra-
constitutional agencies, the gcnro or elder statesmen and the Im-
perial Household Ministry, and three constitutional organs, the
Privy Council, the "supreme command," and the cabinet. The genro
originally included five highly influential clan leaders, Yamagata
Aritomo, Ito Hirobumi and Tnouye Tsuyoshiaki of Choshu, and
Oyama Iwao and ^latsukata ]\Iasayoshi of Satsuma. Later two
others were designated, Katsura Taro of Choshu and Saionji Kim-
mochi, a member of the older civilian nobility, the kuge, which
antedates feudalism. All but Saionji, who is now eighty-three years
old (1933), are dead. Saionji is understood to desire that the in-
stitution shall die with him. There are, however, certain so-called
quasi-genro today w^ho are consulted on crucial issues, so that the
future of the genro is somewhat doubtful. The genro is called by
the Emperor and the cabinet to advise them in every serious dif-
licultv and it enjoys a reputation for well-nigh infallible wisdom.
The Imperial Household Ministry is an organ of the court.
Most influential of the dignitaries that compose it is the Lord
Keeper of the Privy Seal, while only slightly less important are the
minister himself and the Lord Chamberlain. The present Lord
Keeper is Count Makino Xobuaki, head of the house of Satsuma.
The Emperor takes no action without the advice of this agency,
particularly relying upon Count ]\Iakino. The latter, therefore, is
only second to Prince Saionji in his influence upon imperial decisions.
The Privy Council is a body of twenty-seven advisers, chosen
for their proved loyalty and conservatism. All important laws,
treaties, and ordinances must be submitted for the council's ap-
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proval and so influential are its members that the custom has de-
veloped of asking their ap])roval e\en of comparatively unimpor-
tant proposals. The Pri\v C'oimcil is the interpreter of the consti-
tution and conceives its duly in that field to be conservatory rather
than libertarian.
The "supreme command," sometimes termed the "camp," in-
cludes the ministries of war and the navy, the chiefs of the army
and naval stafifs, the board of marshals and admirals and the su-
preme military council. Se])arately and collectively, these organs
enjoy the privilege of advising the Emperor directly, that is, without
the collaboration of the premier or the cabinet as a whole, on mat-
ters of national defense, strategy, and tactics. Since the ministers
of war and the navy are, by ordinance, required to be high ranking
officers ( active or retired ) , of the army and navy respectively, they
form, with their colleagues in the staffs and the advisory councils,
a close corporation of a wholly military character. This is not, of
course, to say that the}- may not be men of wide knowledge and
statesmanlike outlook, but rather that their affiliations with the de-
fense services surround them with men of a certain esprit de corps
that may, on occasion, operate as a severe handicap to independent
thought or action.
Anomalous as it may seem, the cabinet is the least important of
the elements of the crown in the determination of policy. The harsh
term "usurpation," above applied to the activities of the various
agencies already defined, is justified by the constitution itself, which
provides in Article 55 that "the respective ministers of state shall
give their advice to the Emperor and be responsible for it." It
is, of course, a common and essential feature of cabinet or parlia-
mentary government that the ministers rather than the titular head
of the state determine policy and accept responsibility for it. But
in Japan the ministers must take responsibility for policies which
thev do not and cannot determine. Determination of policy still
rests with the traditional agencies above described. These agen-
cies cannot be held responsible since the Emperor, while theoretical-
ly all-powerful, is in fact powerless. Thus, the cabinet must be said,
in general, to be limited to suggestion rather than to decision, to
administration rather than to discretionary action.
The explanation of this situation lies in the nature of the Japan-
ese social order. To understand it, we must recognize that the older
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people of present-day Japan were brouglit up under the feudal sys-
tem, which was abolished only fifty years ago. Moreover, its aboli-
tion was not the product of a popular revolt, but the voluntary pro-
posal of the more powerful clan leaders. Democratic ideas have
percolated to the masses slowly, interpreted by newspapers and
teachers under strict government control. The bulk of the popu-
lation is composed of very poor peasants to whom the Emperor, as
father and chief priest, and the landowner—a scion of the feudal
house which their ancestors have served since time out of mind
—
as ruler of their economic destiny, constitutes what they know of
the state lying beyond the village limits.
The constitution, however, does not leave the "people" entirely
unrepresented. It provides for a Diet, a two-chamber assembly,
composed of a highly aristocratic and plutocratic House of Peers,
and a House of Representatives, chosen by direct manhood suf-
frage in which women do not share. It meets annually and in
special sessions for very brief periods. In 1934 a magnificent new
Diet building, the finest structure in Japan, will be dedicated, an
earnest, it may be hoped, of a future more worthy of the body
it houses than the past.
The extremely conservative nature of the Japanese people is
revealed in the percentage of elderly men elected to the House of
Representatives. Whereas in the first election, when voters were
required to pay fifteen yen (normally $7.50) in direct national
taxes, only 13.7 per cent of the members elected were over fifty
years old, only 3.7 per cent over sixty and none over seventy. In
the 1930 election, imder manhood sultrage, 60.3 per cent were over
fifty, 22.3 per cent over sixty and 1.7 per cent over seventy. Mean-
while the balance of jiower as between town and countrv shifted
from the latter to the former. Forty-eight per cent of the mem-
bershi]) in 1800 came from the farms, in 1^28 only 9.5 per cent:
business-men, industrialists, journalists, law\ers, and doctors had
27.9 per cent nf the lower house in 1890, in 1028 they had ?7 per
cent. More than half of the rc])resentatives elected in 10^0 were
college or university graduates. A nu'nil)er"s salary (3.000 yen),
if viewed as an annual rather than a ([uarterly stipend (the regular
annual session lasts a maximum of three months ])ut membeis
must attend fref|uent extranrdinarv sessions), is ci ini])arable with.
the salar\- of an oftuial in the third {soiiiii) grade of the ci\il service.
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not a complimentary status for members, nor one that is tempting
to men of considerable ability.
The Diet is something more than a debating society. Its ap-
proval is required for the ])assage of laws and for amendments of
the constitution. The budget is laid before it and it may, unless
an emergency or a deficiency can be alleged by the government,
prevent appropriations (saving certain expected categories) or taxes
additional to those embodied in the preceding budget. It must give
consent to loans, and it shares in the power of audit. It may discuss
any topic freely, its members being protected from prosecution for
voicing their sentiments. It has several means of showing con-
cern at or disapproval of cabinet acts or programs, though it can-
not compel the government to resign and there exists no process of
impeachment beyond a vote in either house.
These are meager legislative powers beside those of the execu-
tive, which, acting through the cabinet, controls the convoking and
adjourning of the houses, dissolves the lower house at pleasure, in-
troduces all important bills, possesses the power of veto, so far un-
needed, and dominates finance through control over various cate-
gories of appropriations which are excepted from the scope of Diet
participation, and through its capacity for using emergency and
deficiency appropriations and reserve funds, and even of reexecut-
ing the budget of the previous year if the Diet proves altogether
recalcitrant. The executive power to issue ordinances is exercisable
over the whole field of legislation, though ordinances which amend
or repeal a statute must have c.v post facto approval of the Diet, a
process for saving the Diet's face without interfering with executive
government.
The House of Peers is an abler body than the House of Repre-
sentatives. It conducts its debates with decorum and intelligence.
But it is so largely representative of nobility and wealth that it is
little more than an enlarged edition of the Privy Council, and its
handling of policy is sympathetic toward the oligarchy. The House
of Representatives is packed with professional politicians, men of
small intellect and strong vocal chords, who follow their party
leaders as though vassals of feudal chiefs. Debate there is almost
unknown. Instead there is badgering of the government by the op-
position and booing of the opposition by the government's sup-
porters, often accompanied by fisticuffs in which, on occasion, hired
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ruflfians ha\c jiarticijKited. ^>t the ijalleries of the lower house are
usually packed with excited citizens of hoth sexes while those of the
House of Peers are likely to he deserted.
Why is the puhlic interested in the House of Representatives?
P.ecause. inferior as are its memhers and few and feeble as are its
jiowers today, the peo]ile. or that part of the people, that is political-
ly con.scious, recognizes in it that organ of government over which
they have some control and in which they see their own views to
some degree reflected. The interest of the people in elections is
keen, attendance at campaign meetings is large, the franchise is ex-
ercised by 80 per cent of the qualified voters. Some allowance
must be made for official and employer persuasion, some for bribery
and other corrupt practices, but the writer's personal observation
of the general election of 1930 convinced him that to a praiseworthv
degree the popular interest was spontaneous.
Party life has become firmly interwoven with the bureaucracy
in the texture of the political order. The two large parties, the Sei-
yukai and the Alinscito. each claim over three million registered
members and usually poll about four million votes. These parties
are not easily distinguishable from one another but it may be ven-
tured that the Alinseito is somewhat more inclined to liberalism and
internationalism than the Seiyukai, while the Seiyukai has prospered
by its consistent subser\ience to the Choshu clan and the great busi-
ness house of Mitsui. The Seiyukai is stronger in the rural dis-
tricts, the ]\Iinseito in the cities. There are several other groups,
among them the Kokrmin Doshikai. a business-men's partv with
a platform of getting the government out of business, but all of these
are so small as to be significant only when able to swing the bal-
ance of power to one or other of the major ]iarties. A so-called
liberal ])arty, the Meiseikai. elected a half-dozen menil)ers in 1928
but failed to seat any candidate in P)30 or 1932.
Prior to 1896 no jiartv men were a])])ointo<l heads of ministries.
I'ntil 1918, when I lara Takashi was designated, no commoner
reached the premit-rshi]). Since 1900, when Count Ito. by accepting
the presidency of the ncwl\ organized Seiyukai. affiliated the oli-
garchv with the politicians, it has been usual for the genro to
recommend the ap])ointnient of a ])arty leader to the ])remiership.
thftugh there liaxc been ga])s in the record, such as lliat which began
with the ap]iointniciU of \ iscount ."^aito in Ma\-. 1*'32. I'arty
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premiers have appointed ])art\- cabinets Init jjarty cabinets have
not meant party government, in view of the retention of power in
the traditional agencies of the crown. They have, however, meant
closer contact between the government and the people.
Labor has organized a number of parties since the passage of
the manhood suffrage act but to date they have not polled more
than a half-million votes in a national election and today they
have but five members in the Diet. Their ])latforms are vague
manifestoes of the rights of workers and peasants, necessarily so
if they would exist, since the government has dissolved without a
hearing parties that have exhibited radical tendencies. In 1928,
Premier Tanaka obtained the imperial signature to an ordinance
which made it punishable with death to join a society opposed to
the existing political or economic order. Nevertheless, communism
is constantly increasing in strength through underground tactics.
All parties, including those of labor, are at present under a
cloud of popular criticism because of the frequent cases of graft
in which their members have been involved. The remarkably high
level of literacy in Japan enables the people to read the newspapers
and to get from them accounts of actions in the courts against Diet
and local assembly members. The reaction has been damaging to
the democratic cause and helpful to that of the permanent bureau-
cracy, the small fry wdio swim with the bigger fish in the oligarchical
sea ; helpful also, and especially so, to the army and navy, which
stand out as paragons of purity against the gray background of
political jobbery, though they too have their scandals and their
secret-service funds.
It should be said on behalf of the politicians that the cost of
elections is far beyond the means of most of them, that they must,
to be successful, beg funds from the great trusts. Although the
manhood suffrage act limits a candidate's outlay to an average sum
of ten to twelve thousand yen. the amount actually spent is reckoned
at an average of 50,000 yen ($25,000 at par). The nobility are
poor and cannot subsidize the parties directly, but their relations
with men of wealth are close, so that matters can be arranged with-
out interference with the dominant position of the former in state
affairs. However, there is a weakening of the alliance between tra-
ditionalism and business, in proportion as the latter attains experi-
ence and self-esteem. This tendency holds the largest hope for
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those who would break tlie strangle-hold of the mihtary services
upon governmental policy.
To the laborites and their unregistered 1)ut by no means neglig-
ible liberal supporters an exchange of militaristic government for
unadulterated cai)italisni would not l)e a boon. War on the held of
glory is an occasional event : the war of capital and labor is continu-
ous. C^n the other hand, industrialists and bankers rely upon the
army and ikuv to counter-balance direct actionists among the more
timid of the wage-earners. Thus, there is no clean-cut basis for
labor and capital to act upon, either separately or in alliance, against
the military services. Still, the general attitude of both great
economic groups is hostile to military domination of the state.
To turn now from analysis to illustration, in order that we may
observe the effects of a tisurpation of power upon which contem-
porary events in China cast revealing, if fantastic, light. Incidents
might be related in the domestic field, such as interference with
the normal course of justice in cases involving militarv officers,
but space permits only reference to outstanding instances in which
the control of foreign affairs has been hindered or entirely usurped
by tbe "supreme command."
The despatch of 70,000 troops to Siberia in 1918, following the
invitation of the Ignited States to send but 7,000, was contrary to
the judgment of the Japanese foreign office, as was the continued
occupation of Saghalien after joint intervention had ceased. Dur-
ing the i)eriod of intervention the war office strongly insisted upon
indejjendent action in both Manchuria and Siberia but gave up the
idea when convinced by the foreign office, speaking for the com-
mercial interests, that it would mean war with the United States.
.At that time two treaties were negotiated with China by Jajianese
army and na\\ officers.
During the ])remiershii) of Ceneral I'aron Tanaka, head of the
Cboshu clan, who acted also as niinister t)f fureign afiairs ( 1*)27-
29), a program <if "nositixism" was worked nul and ])ai'tial]\- put
into effect. Intervenlion in Shantung delayed tbe taking of I'eking
b\- the allied op])()nents of .Marshal Chang Tso-lin. janan's Man-
cburian iirntege. .A w.iv later (."bang was driven t)ut of I'eking,
only to meet deatb li\' a^^as--inatii mi w lien bi> ti'ain was bombed
while i)assing under the \iaduct thai cai-i-ie^ \]\r .Sduih .Mancluu'ia
railway <i\'er the reking-Mulxilcii line. Me had lost favor with
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Japan on various counts. Rcs])onsiljilitv for his death has not been
established, but certain liigh Japanese army officers were severely
disciplined in connection with it, which sut^gests that Tanaka him-
self had not contrived the bombin^i^.
The intervention in Manchuria that bei^an on Se])tember 18,
1931, might be viewed as a defensive move within the ]nirview of
the "supreme command" were it not for the failure of the military
departments to turn over to the foreign office the handling of the
issue after the first defensive moves. Baron Shidehara. the foreign
minister, had the negotiations with Mukden over the assassination
of Captain Nakamura well in hand when the destruction of a few
feet of the right of way of the South Manchuria railway occurred.
The army command has not yet demonstrated to foreign satisfac-
tion that the destruction was wrought without Japanese connivance,
but granting that it was. for argument's sake, the failure of the
Chinese forces in Manchuria to resist the first attacks of the Japan-
ese left the way open to diplomatic treatment of the whole issue.
Instead, as is well known, the Japanese forces were augmented
without reference to civilian cabinet opinion and the intervention
went on until the army's objectives were attained. Subsequently the
foreign office entered the case but only as the spokesman of the
army. The creation of the puppet state, "Manchukuo," is a feature
of the Tanaka plan, as is the amalgamation of the several Japanese
civilian governmental services in Manchuria with the Manchurian
command under a military viceroy.
This coup d'aniicc has come with si)ecial force after the de-
feat of the naval stafi:' in 1930 over the London naval treaty. Ad-
miral Kato Kanji. chief of the naval staff, fought strenuously dur-
ing the London conference for the tonnage and categories recom-
mended by the staff and proposed to the conference bv the Japan-
ese delegation. When Premier Hamaguchi overruled him and or-
dered acceptance of a compromise. Kato went to the Emperor and
subsequently issued a statement declaring that the treaty was un-
satisfactory. Popular sentiment, however, supported the com-
promise, and the government won a general election by a landslide
while the conference was in session. L'pon the return of the dele-
gation it was greeted with enthusiastic bancais by welcoming crowds.
Brought before the Privy Council, the treaty was approved. The
Supreme ]\Iilitar}- Council heard the treaty denounced by Admiral
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Kato but did not advise the Emperor against ratification. The treats-
was ratified. Kato resigned hut his place was filled while still warm.
( It had gotten thoroughly warmed during Kato's last weeks in
office.
)
The defeat of the naval staff is explainable when we recall that
Premier Hamaguchi's order to sign the treaty could only be sent
upon the command of the Emperor, advised by the genro and the
Imperial Household Ministry. Signature, thus, was tantamount to
ratification, unless the traditional advisers '"behind the curtain"
should change their minds. They preferred to maintain their orig-
inal position. Thus the oligarchy was split—to the advantage of
cabinet policy. In the Manchurian case there was no such split, so
far as we know, and the civilian ministers had to retreat in disorder.
The army and nav}- always have been the spear-head of the oli-
garchy. While the greatest of the genro. Prince Yamagata Ari-
tomo, was alive, that is, until 1922, there was no cleavage possible
between the various elements of the oligarchy. He was head of the
Choshu clan and he dominated the genro, the Privy Council, the
Imperial Household Ministry and the "supreme command." Since
his death the military services have replaced the genro as initiators
of policy while the genro, reduced in numbers and in vigor, has
been content with an advisory status. The Privy Council has sought
to rej)lace the genro and has gained in influence in some degree but
is still secondary to the older agencies.
Democratic ideas have also had to combat a highly chauvinistic
spirit in the populace, both high and low. which has aided and
abetted the oligarch}'. This has shown itself in the organization of
so-called patriotic societies, such as the Kokusuikai or "National Es-
sence Society," for the cherishing of militant nationalism. Also in
the creation of a \oung men's association with a huge membership,
in which athletic and ])atriotic interests are combined. Into the pa-
triotic societies enter thousands of men whom the Jajxuiese call
sosliii or "ruffians," who stop at nothing in the execution of a patri-
otic mission and who conceive i)atriotism fre(|uently in the sense of
destroying indi\idu:ds who are o]ip()sed to the ])uri)<)ses of the mili-
tary clic|Ue. I nfortunatcly. civilian ministers stoop to use such
men at times, while seeking legislatiNc means to prevent their ac-
ti\ilirs. It is this gang tactics that is rcsi)onsible for the death of
two jiremiers, 1 lamaguchi and Inukai, a recent minister of linance.
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Inonye, the execrtive head of the Mitsui trust, Baron Dan, and
for unsuccessful attacks upon the Emperor, Count Makino, and
former foreign minister Shidehara, within the last two years. Gang-
dom has penetrated the army, as the assassination of Premier Inukai
proved.
It is the fashion today to speak of fascism as a recent phenom-
enon in Japanese political life. lUit in fact, onlv the name is new
and that is borrowed. However, the use of the w^ord appears to re-
flect an intensification and extension of the nationalistic fervor that
has previously distinguished Japan. There have been astounding
plots among military officers, reaching close, if not cjuite, to the
sacred throne. Even the labor parties have been riven by the virus.
As a result Japan today is in a psychopathic condition and life
in Japan is unsafe for liberals, even for those of neutral tint if they
speak from positions of influence in criticism of military policy,
which is today national policy.
To be in the prevailing mode, one should speak of Japan today
as "at the cross-roads," one way leading to further exaltation of
militaristic oligarchy, the other to parliamentary government, the
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former to war, the latter to peace. We shall not he true to the facts
if we. end our present effort at exposition that way. Actually there
is no choice for Japan as yet. She must continue on the only road
she knows for some time to come.
It must not he overlooked that genro government has been high-
ly successful government, that Japan has advanced under it, econ-
omically, at a marvellous i^ace. In the field of foreign relations it
has brought Japan recognition as a great power, large influence, and
a considerable amount of territory. Its leading figures have been
men of ability and honesty. Most important of all, it epitomizes the
inward spirit of Dai Nippon, the national character that, as in all
corntries of any history, is the product of the experience of the
societv it incorporates.
Parliamentarism in Ja]:ian, as in the West, has labored, during
the last two decades, under the handicap of the strenuous condi-
tions of war and the aftermath of war. It would be ungenerous to
expect a new-born parliament to show progress in a period when
old parliaments have suffered unparalleled criticism and immature
ones have succumbed, for pur]:)Oses of policy determination, to
executive agencies. \o doulit the future of popular government
in Japan is wrapped up with that of older constitutional systems.
It is clear, also, that democracy will not flourish in Japan so long
as the i)rescnt rnhapjiy combination of "complexes"—inferioritv
toward certain other great powers and superioritv toward China
( the latter further com]:)licated by the fear of the growth of China
to military strength )
—
persists in that country, (^ne of the most
j)rovocative influences toward preserving this mental condition is
the American attitude on immigration. Another is the .American
program of plucking the Manchurian beam from japan's eye while
feeling no apj^arent discomfort from the several Caribbean motes
in our own. .Another is the international combination against Japan
in the determination of relative na\al strength. There mav be an-
swers to all these arguments. l)ut the answers do not satisfy Japan.
Rumors are heard todax- of a communist revolution in Japan,
one that will have as devastating effects as that in Russia. The
recent intensification of chauxinisni, of "tascism," re\eals a]ipre-
hensions based in part upnn tin- growth of coninumi^m. The ja])an-
esc armv is a ]ieasant arnu' : rcvMli therein wnuKl sjicll the downfall
of the oligarchv. The |a])anese i)easantry is in distress: it is difli-
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cult to conceive how it could, e\cn if it would. supi)ort a long war.
The development of communism in (icrmany, where the ])eople,
like the Japanese, seem to desire drill-master government, may have
a counterpart in Japan. IJut the close-knit fahric of Japanese so-
ciety and the efficiency and honesty of the bureaucracy, taken to-
gether with the strength of the cult of devotion to the Emperor and
the high percentage of literacy, argue powerfully against any thesis
of a communist revolutidu.
If we may predicate the ])ersistence of jiarliamentarism (perhaps
one should say the revival of parliamentarism) in some form, in
the West, it would seem wise to project the unrevolutionary his-
tory of Japanese jwlitics into the future and to anticipate a gradual
evolution of cabinet government. \W conventional, rather than
formal, constitutional processes the Em])er()r would assume the
status of the King of England, the genro would disapi)ear, the Im-
perial Household Ministry would sink to mere ceremonial signi-
ficance, the Privy Council would cease to advise on political issues,
the military services would confine themselves to technical func-
tions, and the House of Peers would be reconstituted or deprived of
a veto. Fortunately for Japan, this development might occur with-
out amendment of the constitution. Formal amendment is today
impossible, but there has, unquestionably, already taken place an ad-
justment of political influence in favor of the people's chamber in
the Diet. The next obvious step is woman suffrage, which has been
voted for local elections in the House of Representatives but has
been blocked by the Peers.
The emergence of the Emperor and the imperial family from se-
clusion is an index of the growth of democracy. The people see
their Tenno frequently, his brothers and their consorts attend pub-
lic gatherings and travel abroad, and the newspapers freely print
photographs and personal items recording happenings in the lives
of their beloved sovereign. Xo people is more keenly sensitive than
the Japanese to the attitudes of other nations toward their institu-
tions, or more desirous of a respected place in the van of progress.
No country possesses more alert newspapers, a wider reading pub-
lic, more conscientious and able judges or more ])enetrating- and en-
lightened juristic minds in the ranks of scholarship. Japan may yet
make her contribution to the annals of true constitutional govern-
ment.
